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COMMENTARY
From risk to fairness
Andreas Kappesa,b, Guy Kahaneb, and M. J. Crocketta,1
Kadcyla is a drug that extends the life of breast cancer
patients by an average of 6 mo. It also happens to be
incredibly expensive. The United Kingdom’s National
Health Service sparked controversy when it refused to
provide this drug to patients, citing its low cost effec-
tiveness. Cases like this raise the question of how so-
cieties should make distributive decisions. Should we
maximize utility or should we aim to improve the lives
of the least fortunate, even if doing so is costly for
everyone else? The influential philosopher John Rawls
tackled this dilemma by framing fair distributive deci-
sions as a kind of gamble (1). Rawls famously argued
that we should choose the kind of society we would all
prefer if our choice was made from behind a “veil of
ignorance”—that is, under conditions of complete un-
certainty about where we would end up. He held that
people should make such choices by following a risk-
averse “maximin” strategy of maximizing the minimum
possible outcome for themselves and others. Echoing
Rawls’s theory, new research by Kameda et al. (2) links
risk and fairness by showing that preferences about risk
and about distribution may arise from common psycho-
logical and neural substrates.
In the experiments, participants made two kinds of
decisions that at first glance seem rather different:
distributive decisions involved allocating payoffs to
anonymous others, whereas risky decisions involved
choosing between lotteries affecting their own payoffs.
However, most participants deployed similar strategies
for both types of decisions. Those who followed a
“Rawlsian” maximin strategy in their distributive deci-
sions tended to adopt a similar strategy for risky de-
cisions, avoiding lotteries with the lowest possible
payoffs. Meanwhile, “utilitarian” participants maximized
total welfare in their distributions and preferred lotteries
that maximized expected payoffs. Participants’ diverse
decision patterns thus appear to mirror the philosophi-
cal debate between Rawls and his utilitarian critics
around how best to address risk and uncertainty when
making wealth distribution decisions (3).
A key insight of this work is that considering the
worst possible outcome is a common feature of both
risky and distributive choices. In the former, we imagine
ourselves on the losing end of the bet; in the latter, we
take the perspective of the least fortunate recipient.
Thus, just as distributive choices involve a conflict of
interests between individuals, risky choices can be
described as a conflict of interest between lucky and
unlucky selves. Others have used a similar logic to show
that intertemporal choices between immediate and
delayed rewards resemble a kind of social dilemma
between present and future selves (4, 5). The common
thread binding all these kinds of decisions is perspec-
tive taking, which has been linked to the right temporo-
parietal junction (RTPJ) (6). Accordingly, Kameda et al.
Fig. 1. Example wealth distribution scenarios, where numbers represent
welfare in arbitrary units; the size of each pie corresponds to total group
welfare. The Rawlsian maximin strategy aims to maximize the welfare of the
worst-off person (highlighted in yellow), whereas the utilitarian strategy aims
to maximize total group welfare (highlighted in blue). Maximin seems fairly
intuitive when it involves only a small cost to group welfare (A). However,
support for maximin may diminish as group welfare costs increase (B).
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report that RTPJ encoded the relative cost of the worst possible
outcome during both risky and distributive choices. Connectivity
analyses suggested that, during decision making, RTPJ commu-
nicates information about the worst possible outcome to the cau-
date, a region involved in computing choice values (7). These
results are consistent with growing evidence that decision mak-
ing for self and others involves shared neurocognitive mecha-
nisms (8) and imply that alternative perspectives—those of
others, or of future selves—are integrated into a common valua-
tion circuitry during decision making. The study advances pre-
vious work by measuring risky and distributive choices in parallel,
rather than in isolation. However, the methods used here do not
permit the conclusion that maximin computations for risky and
distributive choices are carried out by the same neurons. Further
work using methods such as repetition suppression (9) or single-
unit recordings (10) will be necessary to determine whether there
are domain-general neurons in RTPJ that evaluate the worst pos-
sible outcome for both self and others.
Intriguingly, although most participants used similar strategies
for distributive and risky decisions, they were significantly more
likely to follow a maximin strategy for distributive decisions. This
behavioral tendency to be more risk-averse for others than self was
reflected in the neural data, where connectivity between RTPJ and
caudate was stronger for distributive than risky choices. These
findings may indicate that the worst possible outcome carries more
weight when deciding for others than for self, perhaps because
choosing for others has potential moral consequences whereas
choosing for oneself does not. This idea finds additional support in a
recent study where participants chose whether to inflict painful
electric shocks on either themselves or an anonymous other person
in exchange for money (11). Strikingly, most people were more
averse to inflicting pain on others than themselves. One potential
explanation is that people were more uncertain about how others
would experience the shocks, and therefore were afraid that an
amount of pain acceptable for them might be unbearable for the
other person. This uncertainty could have induced a sort of risk pre-
mium on the moral costs of imposing potentially intolerable pain
on another, leading people to deploy a pain-minimizing strategy
when deciding about others’ pain but a profit-maximizing strat-
egy when deciding about their own pain—just as many partici-
pants in the study by Kameda et al. were loss-minimizing for
distributive decisions affecting others but profit-maximizing for
risky decisions affecting only themselves. Both studies are con-
sistent with the “precautionary principle” in policy making,
where actions that might cause harm are prohibited and de-
cision makers must prove that actions are harmless (12). They
also suggest that uncertainty about others’ experiences might
increase prosocial behavior by enhancing the salience of the worst
possible outcome.
The overlap in mechanisms guiding risky and distributive
choices may help explain why people make moral judgments
about risky behavior, even when such behavior does not affect
others (13). It also suggests we might gain insights into social de-
cision making from the vast existing body of research on decision
making under risk and uncertainty. If risk aversion leads people to
adopt a maximin strategy when making distributive decisions,
then factors affecting risk aversion might also impact distributive
decisions. For instance, people perceive risks that evoke stronger
emotional reactions as more dangerous than risks that do not
(14). Accordingly, people might rely more on a maximin strategy
when making distributive decisions that evoke strong emotional
responses, such as when the decision involves identifiable individuals
rather than anonymous groups (15), or when the decisions involve
children rather than adults.
Kameda et al. report that a substantial portion of participants
deployed a maximin strategy aimed at avoiding the worst possible
outcome, especially when distributing wealth for others. However,
before we can conclude whether people are truly Rawlsian, we
need to consider a wider range of choice scenarios than those
presented in the experiments by Kameda et al., where Rawlsian vs.
utilitarian strategies resulted in relatively constrained welfare
differences (Fig. 1A). One can imagine alternative scenarios in
which the maximin strategy only barely improves the welfare of the
New research by Kameda et al. links risk and
fairness by showing that preferences about risk
and about distribution may arise from common
psychological and neural substrates.
worst-off, while dramatically reducing the total welfare of the
group (Fig. 1B). Would people still prefer a maximin strategy in
this case? Similar questions can be raised about the utilitarian
strategy: would people still choose to maximize aggregate wel-
fare even if this results in extremely bad outcomes for the least
fortunate? When faced with cases of this sort, participants might
rather exhibit a pattern of choice closer to the more nuanced
distributive view known as “prioritarianism” (16), according to
which overall outcomes should be maximized (a utilitarian idea)
but where the weight assigned to each potential benefit also re-
flects how much worse off its beneficiary is (a Rawlsian idea).
Uncovering the boundary conditions for distributive preferences—
be they Rawlsian, utilitarian, prioritarian, or something else entirely—
is an exciting avenue for future research.
Few topics divide us as sharply as the question of distributive
justice. On issues like taxation, affirmative action, and healthcare
provision, people are polarized into groups that reach vastly
different conclusions about the best way to organize society.
Likewise, most of the participants in the Kameda et al. studies
divided into those who preferred to prioritize the needs of the
worst off, and those who preferred to maximize overall welfare. It
is hard to resist speculating that divisions between different
political or philosophical camps might be, at least in part, rooted
in diversity at the neurobiological level—which may explain the
seeming intractability of many disputes about distributive justice.
Indeed, critics of Rawls have similarly argued against Rawls’s as-
sumption that people would follow his maximin rule in conditions
of uncertainty, suggesting that individuals might respond to risk
with diverse strategies (3). However, the existence of such diver-
sity in views might also suggest that different strategies—maximin
and utilitarian—serve different functions within a group, and hence,
this diversity may also benefit society. Just as we and other an-
imals have to strike an optimal balance between risk seeking and
risk aversion, societies have to balance a need to maximize over-
all welfare with taking care of the worst-off. Moreover, our ideo-
logical differences may not run as deep as they appear. Kameda
et al. found that Rawlsians and utilitarians alike paid the most
attention to the worst possible outcome when making their
choices, and both groups showed RTPJ activation that corre-
lated with concern for the worst-case scenario. Thus, it does
not seem to be the case that utilitarians simply ignore the plight
of the worst-off; rather, they appear to use this information dif-
ferently than Rawlsians.
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As the authors note in their discussion, Hume’s famous dictum
that “is” does not imply “ought” means we cannot draw direct
normative prescriptions from their findings. However, it is hard
to avoid thinking about the normative implications of the re-
search. Rawls himself insisted that political philosophy must de-
scribe political arrangements that can gain support from real
people (17). If, in line with Rawls, we hold that distributive justice
must reflect a kind of hypothetical contract that we all could
rationally agree to, then the diversity in preferences observed
by Kameda et al. can raise doubts about the possibility of such
a consensus. At the same time, their findings also show there is
a natural inclination to heed the worst-case scenario, suggest-
ing a common starting point—indeed, one that may point in
a Rawlsian direction.
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